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Resumo
Este artigo apresenta um modelo p´ os-Keynesiano de crescimento no qual (i) a taxa de mark-up varia no longo-
prazo em fun¸ c˜ ao da divergˆ encia entre a taxa de lucro efetiva e a taxa de lucro ‘desejada’ pelos capitalistas;
e (ii) a rela¸ c˜ ao capital-produto n˜ ao ´ e necessariamente constante, mas pode variar como consequˆ encia do
progresso tecnol´ ogico, que segundo a classiﬁca¸ c˜ ao de Harrod pode ser neutro, poupador ou dispendioso de
capital. Demonstramos que as condi¸ c˜ oes de estabilidade econˆ omica s´ o podem ser atendidas caso o progresso
tecnol´ ogico seja neutro ou ‘dispendioso’ de capital e o investimento sens´ ıvel a varia¸ c˜ oes na margem de lucro.
Ao submetermos o modelo a simula¸ c˜ oes computacionais, observamos ainda a possibilidade de uma transi¸ c˜ ao
end´ ogena de um regime de acumula¸ c˜ ao do tipo wage-led para proﬁt-led. Ademais, veriﬁcamos uma tendˆ encia
` a estabilidade das taxas de lucro, sob a condi¸ c˜ ao de que a propens˜ ao a poupar dos capitalistas seja elevada.
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01 Introduction
The long-term stability of capitalist economies has been an exhaustively discussed topic in the
history of economic thought. Authors such as Marx (1867),Keynes (1936) and Schumpeter
(1934) pointed out the inherently unstable nature of capitalist economies. The ﬂourish of the
theory of economic growth in XX century, since the seminal articles from Harrod (1939) and
Domar (1946), was followed by a recrudescence of scepticism with regard to the supposedly
self-controlled characteristic of these economies. In fact, one of the fundamental ﬁndings of
the Harrod-Domar model is the so-called “Harrod’s principle of instability”, which states
that any slip from the stable growth-path tends to amplify the economic disequilibrium,
resulting in explosive growth trajectories or chronic depressions.
In the post-Keynesian tradition, subsequently to original formulations from Kalecki
(1954), Robinson (1962) and Rowthorn (1981), the matter of stability remains a quite de-
bated theme. As a result, recent developments in this tradition, for example, Dutt (1994),
You (1994) and Lima (1999) focus on the analysis of economic stability assuming alternative
hypotheses about the relation between: a) growth and income distribution (wage-led accu-
mulation regimes versus proﬁt-led ones); b) technological progress and market concentration;
and c) capital accumulation and productivity expansion. These models have demonstrated
that the instability a la Harrod is not an essential attribute of modern capitalist economies.
Thereby, the existence of non-linearities in these models create a bounded instability, and
restrain the likelihood of explosive growth trajectories or massive decrease in production
level just as predicted in Harrod’s original model.
A common assumption adopted in models that follow a post-Keynesian tradition is the
constancy of the capital-output ratio. Thus, these models explicitly suppose a neutral tech-
nological progress a la Harrod, that is, the type of progress that does not alter the amount of
capital that is technically required to produce an additional unit of output. This hypothesis
is sustained by two main arguments, a theoretical and an empirical one. From a theoreti-
cal standpoint, the assumption of a neutral technological progress la Harrod seems to be
the only manner to reconcile the technological progress with the construction of balanced-
growth models (Bresser-Pereira, 1988, p.49;Solow, 2000, p.4). From an empirical point of
view, the long-term stability of the capital-output ratio was presented by Kaldor (1957) as
one of the ’stylized facts’ of capitalist economies’ growth. So, the assumption of a constant
capital-output ratio would be justiﬁed not only for a theoretical convenience, but also for its
presumed realism.
Nevertheless, recent empirical studies indicate that capital-output ratio is hardly constant
in the long-term. Table 1, reproduced from Maddison (1991, p.54), clearly shows an upward
trend of the capital-output ratio in a group of six developed countries during the period of
1890-1987.
1Table 1: Capital-Output Ratio in Selected Countries (1890-1987)
1980 1913 1950 1973 1987
France n.a 1.64 1.68 1.75 2.41
Germany 2.29 2.25 2.07 2.39 2.99
Japan 0.91 1.01 1.80 1.73 2.77
Netherlands n.a. n.a. 1.75 2.22 2.74
United Kingdom 0.95 1.48 1.68 1.96 2.59
United States 2.09 2.91 2.26 2.07 2.30
Source : Maddison (1991, p.54)
Therefore, the central objective of this paper is to analyse the implications of diﬀerent
assumptions with regard to the behaviour of the capital-output ratio and the dynamics of the
investment towards accumulation regimes and the long-term stability of capitalist economies.
In particular, we analyse the eﬀects of distinct hypotheses about the nature of technological
progress, according Harrod’s terminology (neutral, capital saving or capital intensive), over
conditions for the long-term economic stability. To that end we develop a post-Keynesian
growth model, in the tradition of Robinson (1962), Kalecki (1954) and Rowthorn (1981), in
which (i) the mark-up rate varies in the long-term due to a misalignment between the actual
proﬁt rate and the “desired”proﬁt rate1; and (ii) the capital-output ratio is not necessarily
constant, on the contrary, it may shift as a result of the technological progress that the
economy faces in the long-term.
In this context, we demonstrate that the conditions for economic stability can only be
fulﬁlled if the technological progress is ’neutral’ or ’capital intensive’ and the investment
is sensitive to ﬂuctuations in the mark-up rate. However, in case of a ’capital-saving’ te-
chnological progress or if investment is insensitive to variations in proﬁt margins, then the
conditions to stability may never be fulﬁlled, in other words these economies would be es-
sentially unstable. The corollary for these assumptions is the attested behaviour of the
capital-output ratio during the last 120 years which complies with the long-term stability of
the capitalist economies. Hence, whether these economies are truly unstable, then the reason
for this instability must be pursued elsewhere except for the type of technological progress.
The paper is divided into four sections, including this introduction. In section 2 we
present the model’s framework. In section 3 we examine the long-term dynamics of this
model assuming diﬀerent hypothesis concerning the types of technological progress and the
intensity of the accelerator and proﬁtability eﬀects on investment decisions. In section 4 we
conduct computer simulations on the model. Finally, in section 5 we provide a summary of
our ﬁndings.
1This assumption is inspired on Bresser-Pereira (1988). He states that: “the hypothesis, therefore, is
that ﬁrms, specially in oligopolistic sectors, would establish some sort of ’desired’ proﬁt-rate, that would be
historically determined, according to what managers and share-holders consider to be a reasonable proﬁt
rate. This rate would probably be estimated around 10% to 15% of the ﬁrm’s total capital.”(1988, p. 125)
22 The model’s structure
We suppose an economy where ﬁrms produce a homogenous output and they have market
power, that is to say, these ﬁrms set prices by adding a mark-up rate on the unit costs, which
is constant in the short-term. Then, mark-up price equation is written as:
p = (1 + z)wq (1)
where, p is the price level, z is the mark-up rate (z > 0), w is the money wage rate and
q is inverse of labour productivity, a technical coeﬃcient that represents the amount labour
needed per unit of ﬁnal output2
Let R be the proﬁt rate generated by the capital stock, assumed given in the short-term, u
is the degree of capacity utilisation (deﬁned as u = X
X , where X is the actual output/income
and X the full-capacity potential output/income), m is the share of proﬁts in income, which
is equal to z
1+z and σ is the output-capital ratio (deﬁned as σ = X
K , where K is the value
of the stock of capital in the economy), which is the reciprocal of the capital-output ratio
(Bresser-Pereira, 1988, p.196). It is straightforward to show that:
R = umσ (2)
By following the post-Keynesian tradition of Kaldor (1956), Robinson (1962) and Pasi-
netti (1962), we assume the separation between two social classes: capitalists and workers.
The capitalists save a constant fraction (sc) of their income which is only compounded of
proﬁts while workers ’spend what they earn’, in other words, they consume all their wages
(sw = 0). Thus, this assumptions permit us to show that the aggregate saving per capital




The desired growth rate of the capital stock in this economy is denoted by:
I
K
= α0 + α1m + α2uσ where : α0 > 0,α1 ≥ 0,α2 ≥ 0 (4)
Equation (4) is nothing less than an investment function. The speciﬁcation of this func-
tion is inspired in Bhaduri and Marglin (1990) for whom the desired growth rate of the
capital stock is a separable function of m and u. The only diﬀerence with respect this pre-
vious work consists in including the output-capital ratio as an independent argument in the
investment function.
This formulation is justiﬁed by the fact that the accelerator eﬀect of the output growth in
investment decisions depends upon the rate of capacity utilisation and ’capital productivity’
as well. In fact, given the rate of capacity utilisation, the higher is σ the higher would be
the output level associated with the current capital stock in the economy, and so, the higher
2In the following analysis, we will suppose that labour productivity is growing at an exogenous rate α,
so that q is decreasing at a rate 1




q. Since the mark-up (¯ z)
is constant in the short-term, then any change in labour productivity (q) is entirely incorporated into real
wages (w
p ). This eﬀect implies that unions and workers are well succeeded in bargaining with capitalists,
which also suggests the prevalence of the second stage of capitalism as stated by Kaldor (1957)
3would be the total level of sales. Thus, an increase in the output-capital ratio, ceteris paribus,
would induce a higher investment level due to the accelerator eﬀect.
Finally, if we suppose a closed economy without government, then the goods market
equilibrium requires an equivalence between the saving per unit of capital and the desired

















Equation (7) presents the short-term equilibrium of the degree of capacity utilisation,
that is to say, the degree of capacity utilisation that equalises the planned investment to
savings out of proﬁts. To ensure that u∗ > 0, it is necessary that scm − α2 > 0, which
implies that the share of proﬁts in income must exceed a critical value m∗ denoted by
α2
sc .
The determination of u∗ is pictured in ﬁgure 1 below:
Figure 1:
The eﬀect of a change in the share of proﬁts in income over the short-term equilibrium





σ (scm − α2)
2 (8)
We observe from equation (8) that an increase in the share of proﬁts in income will result
in a decrease of the degree of capacity utilisation. This is a surprising outcome since, in
principle, there are two forces exerting pressure against the degree of capacity utilisation.
On the one hand, an increase in the share of proﬁts in income gives rise to an increase
in aggregate saving because capitalists save a higher share of their income than workers.
4This eﬀect tends to reduce the volume of eﬀective demand and thus, the degree of capacity
utilisation.
On the other hand, investment depends on the share of proﬁts in income which is a proxy
for ’proﬁtability’. So, investment would raise as a consequence of an income redistribution
towards proﬁts, and this would engenders a higher volume of eﬀective demand and a higher
degree of capacity utilisation. However, according to our speciﬁcation of investment function,
the ﬁrst eﬀect is stronger than the second one, so that the degree of capacity utilisation will
reduce in response to an increase in the degree of capacity utilisation. Hence, we conclude
that a wage-led accumulation regime prevails on the economy under consideration.
The eﬀect of a change in the output-capital ratio on the short-term equilibrium of the







We observe from equation (9) that an increase in the output-capital ratio (in other words,
a decrease in the capital-output ratio) will result in a fall of the short-term equilibrium of
the degree of capacity utilisation.
From (8) and (9) it is easy to rewrite u∗ as an implicit function of m and s:
u
∗ = u
∗ (m,σ) ;um < 0, uσ < 0 (10)
3 Long-term dynamics and stability
In the long-term, the share of proﬁts in income and the output-capital ratio cannot be
regarded constant anymore. With reference to the income distribution between capitalists
and workers, the devisal of a ’desired’ proﬁt rate by the capitalists – which is a “social
convention”that prevails at a particular time (cf. Bresser-Pereira (1988, p.125)) – makes
the mark-up rate, and also the share of proﬁts in income, an endogenous variable in the
long-term. Therefore, if the actual proﬁt rate is lower than the ’desired’ proﬁt rate, then the
capitalists would increase the mark-up rate as a device to raise the actual proﬁt rate3. If the
actual proﬁt rate if higher than the ’desired’ rate, then capitalists would reduce the mark-up
rate in order to reduce the actual proﬁt rate to the level given by this ‘desired’ rate4. Thus,
we have the following diﬀerential equation:
˙ m = −θ
 
R − ¯ R

θ > 0 (11)
3We must emphasize that the actual proﬁt rate will only raise, in response to an increase in the mark-up
rate, if the degree of capacity utilisation has a small sensitivity to mark-up rate variations. The reason for
that is the prevalence of a wage-led accumulation regime in this economy. Under these circumstances, an
increase in the mark-up rate will raise the share of proﬁts in income that would ultimately result in a lower
degree of capacity utilisation. If the decline in the degree of capacity utilisation is very steep, then the actual
proﬁt rate may reduce by virtue of an increase in the mark-up rate.
4Why should the capitalists deliberately undertake measures to reduce the proﬁt rate? A possible answer
for this question is given by the theory of “barriers to new competitors”from Bain (1956) and Labini (1984).
According to this theory, the desired proﬁt rate can be considered the proﬁt rate that is compatible with the
long-term stability of an industry, that is to say, the maximum proﬁt rate level that would not induce the
entrance of new competitors in the industry. Hence, if the actual proﬁt rate is above its ’desired’ level, then
this would invite new competitors to enter and consequently, in the long-term, it would cause a decrease in
proﬁts and reduce the market power of established ﬁrms. A post-Keynesian macroeconomic model consistent
with the theory of barriers to new competitors is presented in Oreiro (2004).
5where, ¯ R is the ‘desired’ proﬁt rate and θ determines the speed of adjustment of proﬁt rate
to the ‘desired’ level5.
3.1 The dynamics of diﬀerent technological progress modalities
The type of technological progress that is occurring int the economy determines the dynamics
of the output-capital ratio. The output-capital ratio can only be regarded constant if the




If the technological progress is ’capital saving’, then the output-capital ratio will increase
over time,indicating that the production of one unit of output requires less and less capital.
In this case, we suppose that the output-capital ratio increases at a constant and exogenous
rate h > 0, in such a manner that:
˙ σ
σ
= h > 0 (13)
Eventually, if the technological progress is ’capital intensive’, then the output-capital
ratio will diminish over time, indicating that more and more capital is necessary to produce
a unit of output. Again, we suppose that the output-capital ratio decreases at a constant
and exogenous rate h < 0, i.e.
˙ σ
σ
= h < 0 (14)
3.1.1 Long-term dynamics when technological progress is neutral
When the technological progress is neutral a la Harrod, the output-capital ratio is constant
and the long-term dynamics of this economy is completely outlined by equation (11).
Substituting (10) into (2) and the resulting equation into (11) we obtain the following
diﬀerential equation that presents the dynamic behaviour of the share of proﬁts in income:
˙ m = −θ

mσu
∗ (m,σ) − ¯ R

(15)




∗ (1 − εu,m) (16)





um denotes the elasticity of the degree of capacity utilisation with
respect to the share of proﬁts in income.
5Lavoie (2002) proposes another adjustment mechanism for proﬁt rate misalignments. For him, the actual
proﬁt rate results from a conﬂict of interests between workers - who desire a high real wage level and thus, a
low proﬁt rate - and capitalists - who desire a high proﬁt rate. In this framework, however, capitalists - for
some unspeciﬁed reasons - are not capable to induce the adjustment of actual level of proﬁt rate towards its
‘desired’ level so, capitalists can only adjust their ‘desired’ proﬁt rate, according to the following equation:
˙ ¯ R = −θ( ¯ R − R).
In equation 11, on the other hand, we assume that capitalists change their mark-up rate in order to adjust
the proﬁt rate to an exogenously determined ‘desired’ level, and then they implicitly change the share of
proﬁts in income. In Lavoie’s speciﬁcation, the ‘desired’ proﬁt rate is endogenous in the long-term, and in
our terms, he would have θ < 0.
6Let m∗ be a ﬁxed value from (15), that is, the value of m that holds the share of proﬁts
in income constant over time. This value is a stable equilibrium if and only if ∂ ˙ m
∂m < 0 (cf.
Takayama (1993, p.336)). But that requires the fulﬁlment of one condition, namely:
εu,m < 1 (17)
In words: the long-term equilibrium will be stable if and only if the elasticity of the degree
of capacity utilisation with respect to the share of proﬁts in income is less than an unity.
In order to better understand the economic logic beneath this result let us suppose an
initial situation where the actual proﬁt rate is below the ‘desired’ proﬁt rate. In these
circumstances, the capitalists would increase the mark-up rate with the aim to raise the
actual proﬁt rate up to the ‘desired’ level. However, the increase in mark-up rate will
result in an income redistribution towards proﬁts, which will reduce the volume of eﬀective
demand and consequently, the degree of capacity utilisation. If the fall in the degree of
capacity utilisation is very steep, then it will outweigh the eﬀects of an increase in the mark-
up rate on the proﬁt rate. Thus, the actual proﬁt rate will decrease instead of increase,
which would persuade the capitalists to raise the mark-up rate even further and so evidently
the proﬁt rate dynamics will be non-convergent. In order to avoid this instability, the degree
of capacity utilisation must present a lower sensitivity to changes in the share of proﬁts in
income, in other words, the condition (17) must be satisﬁed.
3.1.2 Long-term dynamics when technological progress is ’capital saving’
When the technological progress is ’capital saving’, the dynamic behaviour of the economy
is characterized by a system of diﬀerential equations in σ (13) and m (15).
Linearising the system around its steady state and expressing the resulting equations in




















The system of equations represented in (18) will be stable only if the determinant and
the trace of the jacobian matrix are respectively positive and negative (cf. Takayama (1993,
pp.407-408)). From these relations follow the conditions for system’s stability:
DET = −hθσu
∗ (1 − εu,m) (19)
TR = −θσu
∗ (1 − εu,m) + h (20)
From equation (19) we may notice that the determinant of the jacobian matrix will
be positive if and only if εu,m > 1, namely, if the degree of capacity utilisation is very
sensitive to changes in the share of proﬁts in income. Notwithstanding, if this condition
holds then the trace of the jacobian matrix will be necessarily positive, making the system
unstable. On the other hand, if the previously referred elasticity is less than one, then the
trace of the jacobian matrix can be negative but its determinant will be also negative and
the system is also inevitably unstable. Therefore, we conclude that in case of a ’capital
saving’ technological progress the conditions for stability will never be met and the system
is intrinsically unstable.
73.1.3 Long-term dynamics when technological progress is ’capital intensive’
When the technological progress is ‘capital intensive’, the dynamic behaviour of the economy
is characterized by a system of diﬀerential equations analogous to that represented in (18),
with a diﬀerence that in the new system we have h < 0. Thus, the determinant and the
trace of the jacobian matrix remain expressed by (19) and (20).
Given that h < 0, the determinant of the jacobian matrix will be positive if the elasticity
of the degree of capacity utilisation with respect to the share of proﬁts in income is less than
unity. In these conditions, the trace of the jacobian matrix is necessarily negative and the
system is stable. As a consequence of this, we conclude that in case of a ’capital intensive’
technological progress the economic system is stable only if the degree of capacity utilisation
presents low sensitivity to variations in the share of proﬁts in income.
3.2 The acceleration and proﬁtability eﬀects over investment
The investment function speciﬁed in (4) complies with a post-Keynesian tradition6 and is
inﬂuenced by an interaction between the proﬁtability and acceleration eﬀects7, respectively
represented by the terms α1m and α2σu. The investment sensitivity to both eﬀects is
straightly bound to the values of the parameters α1 and α2. Consequently, these parameters
deﬁne the long-term dynamics of the model and the particular conditions for the steady-
state equilibrium. In the next subsections we identify the attributes required for stability
and assess the mentioned eﬀects separately and simultaneously.
3.2.1 Acceleration eﬀect
Assuming that α1 = 0, we isolate the acceleration eﬀect on investment. In this situation,




σ (scm − α2)
(7a)
This will be a positive value if and only if sc >
α2
m = s∗
c, in other words, the savings out
of proﬁts ratio must exceed a critical value s∗
c, which inversely depends upon the share of
proﬁts in income.
With regard to the elasticity of the degree of capacity utilisation with respect to the share







scm−α2 > 1, given that α2 > 0. Therefore, from (16) we have ∂ ˙ m
∂m = −θσu∗ (1 − εu,m) > 0,
so we deduce that an increase in the share of proﬁts in income would lead the capitalists
to raise the mark-up rate even further. The explosive trajectory of the share of proﬁts in
income suggests the occurrence of a “worker’s euthanasia”in the long-term.
6c.f. Robinson (1962, cap.2), Rowthorn (1981) and Bhaduri and Marglin (1990)
7The acceleration eﬀect occurs when investment, which is a decision to enlarge the productive capacity,
reacts to current or foreseen changes in aggregate demand (that in our analysis is represented by through
the degree of capacity utilisation). When the proﬁt rates increase capitalists are impelled to expand the
productive capacity, that is, to invest and this is called proﬁtability eﬀect.
83.2.2 Proﬁtability eﬀect
Supposing that α2 = 0, we separately consider the proﬁtability eﬀect over investment. In






and the dynamics of m is given by equation







The steady-state value share of proﬁts in income is:
m
∗ =
sc ¯ R − α0
α1
(21)
Two conditions result from this outcome: ﬁrstly, m∗ is a positive value provided that
sc >
α0
¯ R ; secondly, it is economically inconceivable that m∗ > 1. Therefore, to ensure that
1 > m∗ > 0 a coherent combination of parameters is needed, so that
α0
¯ R > sc >
α0+α1
¯ R (22).
3.2.3 Simultaneous operation of acceleration and proﬁtability eﬀects
In this situation we assume that α1 > 0 and α2 > 0. Substituting (7) into (15), the dynamics
of the share of proﬁts in income is written as the equation below:







Deriving (11c) with respect to m we obtain ∂ ˙ m
∂m = θ
[α0α2−α1m(scm−α2)]
(scm−α2)2 . As we have veriﬁed
in section 3.1.1, the system’s stability depends upon that the condition ∂ ˙ m
∂m < 0 holds, that
is to say, an increase in the share of proﬁts in income must not induce capitalists to raise the
the mark-up rate more and more. Thus, the savings out of proﬁts ratio must be suﬃciently
high to ascertain that:
sc >
α2 (α0 + 2α1m)
α1m2 (23)
This condition must be held along the entire trajectory of m, since its initial condition
until its steady-state value. Additionally, from (7), in order that the degree of capacity










3.3 Conﬁgurations for the model’s stability
In table 2 below we compile the previous analysis for diﬀerent combinations among tech-
nological progress modalities and speciﬁcations of investment function, and we present the
long-term behaviour of the output-capital ratio and the share of proﬁts in income.
9Table 2: Stability conditions
Technological Neutral Capital Saving Capital Intensive
Progress h = 0 h > 0 h < 0
Investment
Acceleration Eﬀect m: Explosive m: Explosive m: Explosive
α1 = 0 σ: Constant σ: Explosive σ → 0
Proﬁtability Eﬀect m: Stable in the m: Stable in the m: Stable in the
α2 = 0 long-term long-term long-term
σ: Constant σ: Explosive σ → 0
Combined Eﬀects m: Stable in the m: Stable in the m: Stable in the
α1 > 0 and α2 > 0 long-term long-term long-term
σ: Constant σ: Explosive σ → 0
We verify that the steady-state equilibrium is a feasible result in the long-term only if
the technological progress is neutral or capital intensive and besides, if the investment is
susceptible to variations in the share of proﬁts in income.
4 Computer simulations
To evaluate the dynamics and interactions between the variables of the model in three
diﬀerent types of technological progress we carry out a computer simulation8, by adopting
a top-down methodology9. So, we assigned economically plausible10 values for the model’s
parameters, according to table 3 below:
8To proceed the numerical simulations we used Maple 7.0 from Waterloo Maple Inc.
9This procedures involves the adjustment of a preexistent economic model to a numerical simulation
environment. An opposite methodology would involve the creation of a model designed to simulations.
The ﬁrst method entails some diﬃculties in setting up real and/or plausible values for the variables and
parameters, however it enriches the assessment of interactions among the selected variables, which could
hardly be accomplished with an ordinary quantitative analysis.
10For example, the savings out of proﬁts ratio was assigned with the purpose of fulﬁlling conditions (3.2.2)
and (23). It is not a “manna that falls from heaven”once a savings out of proﬁts ratio of 42% seems to
be a reasonable value and is also coherent to Samuelson’s “principle of correspondence”that corroborates




θ 0.5 Adjustment factor of the proﬁt rate.
α0 0.02 Autonomous term of the investment function which
represents the animal spirits of capitalists.
α1 0.02 Coeﬃcient that expresses the investment’s sensibility to
proﬁt ﬂuctuations
Coeﬃcient that measures the accelerator eﬀect, namely
α2 0.02 the inﬂuence of changes in the degree of capacity
utilisation and the output-capital ratio on investment.
¯ R 0.09 ‘desired’ proﬁt rate
sc 0.42 Savings out of proﬁts.
We used as an initial values for the economy under consideration, a share of proﬁts in
income of 30% and a output capital ratio of 0.5, which is tantamount to a capital-output
ratio of 2. When the technological progress is capital saving or capital intensive we suppose
respectively a variation rate of the output-capital ratio equals to 0.01 and -0.01, that is to
say, a variation rate of 1% in each period. We arbitrarily stipulate 100 periods as range for
the analysis.
In the simulations we examine the dynamics of the share of proﬁts in income (m), the
degree of capacity utilisation (u∗), the output-capital ratio (s) and the proﬁt rate over time
and under diﬀerent assumptions with regard to technological progress (neutral, capital saving
and intensive) and to the investment’s sensibility to changes in the proﬁt margins and the
degree of capacity utilisation. With reference to the later we focus our analysis on the
trajectory over time of the variables under consideration in three distinct scenarios, which
are: α1 = 0 (investment is not sensitive to changes in proﬁt margins); α2 = 0 (investment
is not sensitive to changes in the degree of capacity utilisation) and; α1 > 0, α2 > 0(the
investment is sensitive to both changes in m and u).
4.1 Case 1: Accelerator eﬀect only (α1 = 0)
As we have demonstrated in section 3.1.1, the dynamics of the share of proﬁts in income
implies that ∂ ˙ m
∂m > 0, which causes the system to be unstable11. The ﬁgure 2 below represents
the economic dynamics when the technological progress is neutral:
11The elasticity of the degree of capacity utilisation with respect to the share of proﬁts in income is εu,m > 1
so that ∂ ˙ m
∂m = −θσu∗ (1 − εu,m) > 0. Consequently, given the parameters in table 2 and independently if
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Figure 2: The curve pk represents σ, namely










0 20 40 60 80 100
Figure 3:
As we may notice, in both cases the share of proﬁts in income clearly presents an explosive
trajectory over time.
When technological progress is capital intensive, as in ﬁgure 3, the output-capital ratio
exhibits a descendent path and, as stated by equation (7a), this attenuates the decline of
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Figure 5:
When technological progress is capital saving (Figure 4), both m and σ increase indeﬁ-
nitely, thus the degree of capacity utilisation falls even faster to a close to zero level.
We conﬁrm that the share of proﬁts out of income truly presents an explosive trend:
lim
t→∞m = ∞. As a result, the degree of capacity utilisation tends to fall down to zero:
lim
t→∞u∗ = 0. Since these variables follow opposite directions, they sustain the proﬁt rate at
a level of 4.37%. So, the actual proﬁt rate (R) will never reach the ‘desired’ proﬁt rate level
( ¯ R). The growth rate of the capital stock will remain relatively stable over time, moving
from a initial level of 2.375% to stabilise itself at 2%, which is equal to α0. This outcome
reveals that capitalist will keep investing even in a total stagnation scenario (u∗ → 0). In
this situation, the investment depends solely on the entrepreneurs’ animal spirits.
Notably, the type of technological progress have no eﬀects on the dynamics of share of
proﬁts in income and the degree of capacity utilisation.
124.2 Case 2: Proﬁtability eﬀect only (α2 = 0)
When we disregard the acceleration eﬀect on investment and consider the proﬁtability eﬀect
only, the share of proﬁts in income become stable over time, despite the kind of technological
progress. This phenomenon is explained by equation (11b) which shows that m’s dynamics
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Figure 7:
In ﬁgure 6 above, we may observe the asymptotic behaviour of the share of proﬁts in
income, which according to equation (21) presents a steady-state equilibrium around 90%.
The short-term equilibrium of the degree of capacity utilisation goes from an initial value
around 41% to stabilise itself at 20%. Therefore, in case of a neutral technological progress
all variables converge toward their long-term equilibrium value.
When technological progress is capital intensive (Figure 7), we observe that the share of
proﬁts in income and the output-capital ratio both converge toward their own steady-state
equilibrium and σ falls down to zero in the long-term.
At the beginning of the analytical period, m presents a sharp increase which causes a
decrease of the degree of capacity utilisation (see equation 7b). However, as σ declines
(tending to zero) and the m increases slightly, then the degree of capacity utilisation reverts
its downward trend and displays increasing variation rates. In this situation, the output
grows more slowly than the capital stock growth rate (because technological progress is
capital intensive: σ → 0), hence it imposes an additional eﬀort over the installed productive
capacity with intention to maintain the equilibrium level of the share of proﬁts in income.
It is interesting to notice that in the initial stage when an increase in the share of proﬁts
in income induces a reduction of u∗, indicating a wage-led accumulation regime. However,
the behaviour of u∗ endogenously changes12 over time and the model exhibits a proﬁt-led
accumulation regime, in other words, as m increases it raises the degree of capacity utilisation.
12Bhaduri and Marglin (1990) identiﬁed the requisites for the proﬁt-led and wage-led accumulation regimes.
Given that their model involved comparative statics analyses, the transition from one accumulation regime
to another does not take place over time but it would depend on the degree of capacity utilisation level.
By using our speciﬁcation for variables and parameters we have, in accordance with Bhaduri and Marglin
(1990), that: a) a wage-led accumulation regime occurs if u∗ > α1
sc ; b) a proﬁt-led accumulation regime
occurs if u∗ < α1
sc . This relation is not supported by ﬁgure 7, because we observe situations where distinct
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Figure 9:
When technological progress is capital saving (ﬁgure 8), the output-capital ratio pre-
sents an explosive behaviour but it does not alters the stability of the degree of capacity
utilisation: lim
t→∞u∗ = 0. A higher capital productivity (↑ σ) and the increase of m up to
its equilibrium value implies a reduction in the short-term equilibrium level of the degree
of capacity utilisation, which begins the process around 41%. These trajectories denote a
wage-led accumulation regime.
The trajectories of the proﬁt rate and investment rate are pictured in ﬁgure 9 and they are
not subject to diﬀerent types of technological progress. This phenomenon happens because
both variables depends only on m, which, after presenting an upward trend, becomes stable















As ﬁgure 9 illustrates, the proﬁt rate starts its trajectory at 6.15% and then converges
in the long-run to the ‘desired’ growth rate: lim
t→∞R = ¯ R = 0.9. The desired growth rate of
the capital stock also raises from 2.6% up to its equilibrium value of 3.8%.
4.3 Case 3: Proﬁtability and accelerator eﬀects on investment(α1 >
0 e α2 > 0)
Now, we will analyse the dynamics resulting from both proﬁtability and accelerator eﬀects
on investment decisions. Just as in case 2, the share of proﬁts in income tends to become
stable in the long-term. This is a consequence of the fulﬁlment of the condition expressed in
(23) during the whole dynamics of m, since its initial value m0 = 30% until its steady-state
equilibrium m∗ = 78,5%. It is important to notice that this value for m is very near the
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Figure 11:
When technological progress is neutral, as ﬁgure 10 illustrates, all variables converge to
their own equilibrium values in the long-run. As the share of proﬁts in income increases
we observe that the degree of capacity utilisation decreases, and this indicates a wage-led
accumulation regime.
When technological progress is capital intensive (Figure 11), a phenomenon similar to
case 2 occurs: σ tends to zero and the share of proﬁts in income converge to its long-term
equilibrium. It is noteworthy to observe again an endogenous transition from a wage-led to
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Figure 13:
When technological progress is capital saving, according to the analysis done in section
3, even though m and u∗ reach stable values, the system is not entirely stable since the
output-capital ratio presents an explosive trajectory.
In ﬁgure 13 we notice that both proﬁt and investment rate become stable in the long-term.
They converge respectively to 9% (the desired proﬁt rate value) and 3.8%.
When we observe the ﬁgures above we verify that the dynamics of variables in case 3
are similar to case 2 where the proﬁtability eﬀect on investment was considered separately.
Remarkably, when we take the sensibility of investment to changes in the output-capital
ratio (through the accelerator eﬀect) into account, the transition of all other variables to
15their long-term equilibrium happens more slowly. Furthermore, the steady-state equilibrium
values also change, except for the proﬁt rate which still converge to the ‘desired’ level.
For instance, when technological progress is neutral, the degree of capacity utilisation will
stabilise itself around 22.9% while in case 2 the equilibrium value is 20%.
Two interesting outcomes derive from the computer simulations above:
1. In all cases, m raised over time which implied a higher income concentration on proﬁts
(possessed by capitalists) whereas the degree of capacity utilisation fell down in almost
every cases, except for α2 = 0 and h < 0 and for α1 > 0, α2 > 0 and h < 0. We
then deduce that the investment’s sensibility to changes in uσ and m are only relevant
for the dynamics of the degree of capacity utilisation when technological progress is
capital intensive.
2. The proﬁt and investment rate remained relatively stable in all situations indicating
that capitalists are well succeeded in sustaining these rates, even though in diﬀerent
values from the ‘desired’ proﬁt rate level (in case of α0 = 0). We also veriﬁed that
both proﬁt rate and investment rate are not determined by the type of technological
progress and hence, by changes in output-capital ratio.
4.4 The robustness of results
In order to prove the robustness of simulation’s results, we submit the parameters to a stress
test. We consider investment function to be depedent on both accelerator and proﬁtability
eﬀects (α1 > 0 e α2 > 0) and then we change each one of the parameters on table 3, ceteris
paribus, under two types of technological progress: neutral and capital intensive.






0.774 0.233 0.0378 0.09
Values Table 3
α0
0.025 0.431 0.417 0.0378 0.09
0.015 1.055 0.171 0.0377 0.09
α1
0.040 0.290 0.620 0.0378 0.09
0.015 1.080 0.167 0.0379 0.09
α2
0.030 0.696 0.259 0.0378 0.09
0.010 0.836 0.215 0.0378 0.09
¯ R
0.100 1.000 0.200 0.0420 0.10
0.080 0.529 0.303 0.0336 0.08
sc
0.500 1.170 0.154 0.0449 0.09
0.370 0.476 0.378 0.0333 0.09
θ
0.750 0.774 0.233 0.0378 0.09
0.720 0.774 0.233 0.0378 0.09
Table 4 exhibits the long-term steady-state values of the share of proﬁts in income, the
degree of capacity utilization, the investment and proﬁt rates, when technological progress is
16neutral. Conditions denoted by equations 23 and 24 impose some restrictions on parameters’
values that fulﬁll some notional limits on variables (for example, 0 < m < 1). As we can see,
when we change parameters such as α0 by some amount, for example 25%, some conditions
may not hold and the reason some variables ‘unleash’ (m > 1) is because the primary
values, presented in table 3 are on the threshold of these conditions. The tests disclosed the
sensibility of the share of proﬁts in income to the ‘desired’ proﬁt rate. Changes in θ had no
eﬀects over the long-term values of the variables under considerations, it changed the speed
of convergence.






0.774 ∞ 0.0378 0.09
Values Table 3
α0
0.025 0.431 ∞ 0.0378 0.09
0.015 1.055 ∞ 0.0377 0.09
α1
0.040 0.290 ∞ 0.0378 0.09
0.015 1.080 ∞ 0.0379 0.09
α2
0.030 0.696 ∞ 0.0378 0.09
0.010 0.836 ∞ 0.0378 0.09
¯ R
0.100 1.000 ∞ 0.0420 0.10
0.080 0.529 ∞ 0.0336 0.08
sc
0.500 1.170 ∞ 0.0449 0.09
0.370 0.476 ∞ 0.0333 0.09
θ
0.750 0.774 ∞ 0.0378 0.09
0.250 0.774 ∞ 0.0378 0.09
h
-0.030 0.774 ∞ 0.0378 0.09
-0.005 0.774 ∞ 0.0378 0.09
When we considered a capital intensive technological progress, we ﬁrstly noted that the
parameters had no eﬀects over the long-term value of capacity utilization, which increased
indeﬁnitely. When we changed h, there was no eﬀect over long-term values. Just as θ, this
parameters only set the speed of convergence. Once more, we noticed that in some cases,
for example when we reduced α1 by 25%, the share of proﬁts in income became inconsistent
(m > 1), but then again this happened because the primary values were set almost on the
limit of conditions 23 and 24.
5 Concluding remarks
In previous sections we analysed the dynamics of some economic variables: the share of proﬁts
in income, the output-capital ratio, the proﬁt and investment rate under diﬀerent assump-
tions about the type of technological progress and the speciﬁcation of investment function.
They let us enquire the conditions for the long-term stability of capitalist economies.
17We veriﬁed, by means of computer simulations, that the type of technological progress
is essential to determine the requirements for economic stability. Thus, if the technological
progress is capital saving then the conditions for stability will never be met, which implies
that such capitalist economy is necessarily unstable. Stability is a probable result only if
the technological progress is neutral or capital intensive. Under these situations, it is a
necessary condition to the stability, that the elasticity of the degree of capacity utilisation
with respect to the share of proﬁts in income is less than an unity, that is to say, changes
in the functional income distribution must have a slight inﬂuence on eﬀective demand, and
consequently, on the degree of capacity utilisation. Another determinant of a long-term
stability is the prevalence of a high propensity to save out of proﬁts. If this ratio is not
comparatively low, it could not ensure the equilibrium (at a positive value) of the share of
proﬁts in income, in other words, in face of an increase in the share of proﬁts in income,
the entrepreneurs would be impelled to increase the proﬁt margin even further and it would
cause the proﬁt’s trajectory to be explosive. Besides, if investment is quite dependent on
the accelerator eﬀect, which means that proﬁt changes does not aﬀect investment, then the
share of proﬁts in income will not achieve its long-term equilibrium value.
Computer simulations have revealed that, despite the modalities of technological progress
and the speciﬁcations of investment function, the proﬁt rate have kept at stable levels during
its long-term trajectory. The variation range of the proﬁt rate, from its initial level until
equilibrium, was relatively small. This outcome denies Marxist predictions that the proﬁt
rate would inexorably decline over time.
Moreover, when technological progress is capital intensive and the investment is sensitive
to changes in the share of proﬁts in income, the surprising phenomenon of an endogenous
transition from a wage-led to a proﬁt-led accumulation regime arise. The reason for that is
the simultaneous eﬀect of the decrease in the output-capital ratio, and the increase in the
share of proﬁts in income up to an equilibrium level. In all other situations, as the income
distribution becomes more concentrated on proﬁts we may observe a decrease in the degree
of capacity utilisation (in some situations it falls down to zero), and this indicates a wage-led
accumulation regime during the whole economy’s trajectory.
Recent empirical studies about the long-term dynamics of capitalist economies have
shown an apparent upward trend in the capital-output ratio in the last 120 years. Hence,
we conclude that the technological progress have been, up to present, ’capital intensive’ a la
Harrod. Unless there are strong motives to believe that the growth rate of the capital stock
is independent to the share of proﬁts in income, the requirements for the long-term stability
of capitalist economies would have been satiﬁed. In other words, the technological progress,
at least in its present state, is not the source of economic instability.
Nevertheless, instability is actually a distinctive attribute of capitalist economies. Ac-
cording to Maddison (1991), the average growth rate of developed capitalist countries have
been varying substantially over time. Long periods of rapid growth - such as the ’golden age’
of capitalism during the period of 1950-1973 - alternates with periods of semi-stagnation or
moderate growth.
The post-Keynesian literature has pointed out two alternative sources for economic insta-
bility. The ﬁrst, with a Marxist inspiration, would involve a class struggle between capitalists
and workers. Goodwin (1967) have demonstrated that a class conﬂict may breed a limit cy-
cle dynamics for the share of wages (and proﬁts) in income and for the unemployment rate.
The second, inspired in Minsky’s (1975; 1982) approach, is based on the interaction between
18Harrod’s principle of acceleration and the endogenous money supply assumptions. This ap-
proach is formally developed by Gonz´ alez-I-Calvet (1999), among other authors. It follows
from these analyses that the causes of economic instability might be investigated taking into
account these alternative sources except for the technological progress.
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